THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES

FRANCIS VINTON GREENE
MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.V.

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BY

FRANCIS VINTON GREENE

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PREFACE

THE following pages are, substantially, a reprint of an address recently delivered in Portland, Maine, at the request of the Economic Club of that city.

I hope that they may, in some small degree, help to persuade the civilians, the voters, the "plain people" of Lincoln, the lovers of peace and all its infinite benefits, to give calm but thoughtful consideration to this question of adequate national defense. It is eminently worthy of their consideration.

FRANCIS V. GREENE.

BUFFALO, February 1, 1915.

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I feel somewhat diffident in speaking in such distinguished company, and I should hesitate to appear with them,* but for the fact that all my life I have studied—and at times written upon—the important subject which is under discussion to-night; and, I may frankly say, have never accomplished anything by anything I have ever written upon it. I am not alone in that. The most distinguished soldiers we have ever had—General Sherman in particular—have written to the same effect, but without producing the slightest impression upon the minds of their countrymen. In 1876, more than a generation ago, General Sherman was chairman of a commission appointed by

* The other speakers were Lieutenant-General Nelson A. Miles, U. S. Army, and Professor John Graham Brooks, of Harvard; one of them the only survivor of the leading generals in the Civil War and of the great Indian-fighters of 1865–1890, and the other, one of the most profound economic students of the day.

Act of Congress to study and report upon this same question that we are discussing to-night, viz.: the question of our national defense and the formulation of a military policy suited to our special requirements. Nobody now knows that this commission was appointed; the fact has long since been forgotten. I know about it because I was for a time the secretary of the commission. General Sherman was then in command of the army, a soldier of world-wide reputation. His vivid memoirs had already been published: his duties as commanding general of the army (the constitutional Commander-in-Chief, who at that time was also a great general, Grant, and the Secretary of War being present) were not such as to deprive him of the leisure necessary for this important work; and, as we all know, he wielded the pen not so much of a ready writer as of a vigorous soldier, and he expressed his thoughts clearly, incisively. And General Sherman threw himself into the task as chairman of this commission with his usual enthusiasm. He thought that

perhaps he might be instrumental in formulating a definite military policy for this country, and he welcomed the chance of doing this, which he hoped would be the capstone of his military career. He searched our military archives from the time of Washington to the time of Grant. He pored over the endless and tiresome documents in those massive quartos entitled "American State Papers,"* and particularly the seven volumes on "Military Affairs," March 3, 1789, to March 1, 1838, the existence of which is now known only to the historical specialist of more than ordinary curiosity. He examined all the unpublished records of the Mexican War. He was himself the creator of a great part of the most valuable records of the Civil War, then just beginning to be published. He worked ten and twelve hours a day at this, with the same ardor that he displayed in his pursuit

* "American State Papers. Military Affairs." Vols. III to VII (1823 to 1838) and vols. XII and XIII (1789 to 1825), selected and edited, under the authority of Congress, by the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of the House of Representatives. Large quartos, about 1,000 pages and 3,000,000 words in each volume.

of the wily Joe Johnston from Chattanooga to Atlanta. From all these voluminous data of millions of words he prepared a history of the army and of our military policy—or lack of policy—concise, accurate. The curious, if so minded, may find it in the musty records of the Forty-fourth Congress, as a Senate Executive Document. Not content with his own researches and opinions, he summoned the principal soldiers of the Civil War (it was only eleven years after Appomattox and most of them were still living) to testify before the commission and to put in writing their matured views as to what ought to be the military policy of the United States, and the proper organization of our military strength and enormous but undeveloped military resources in order to carry this policy into effect. Hancock, Schofield, McDowell, McClellan, Terry, Pope, Ord, Humphreys, Meigs, Townsend, and Garfield responded in short but comprehensive papers.

After nearly seven months of this labor the documents were transmitted to Congress,

with a definite, explicit recommendation as to the legislation necessary to give us a definite military policy.

What happened? The documents were printed, part of the tons of documents which come out of the Government Printing Office during every session of Congress. No more. There was a brief debate, no action, and the subject was dropped. Two years later a "Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Army" was appointed, with General Burnside, then a Senator from Rhode Island, as chairman and General M. C. Butler, then a Senator from South Carolina, as one of its members. The survivors of the Civil War who had held high command were again summoned to give their testimony, eminent civilians were called upon to give their views, again a document was printed (Forty-fifth Congress, 3rd Session, Senate Report No. 555, pp. 512), and again, after a brief debate, the subject was dropped. It was not seriously taken up again for thirty years.

Why was this? Because in the brief de-

bates above referred to it was stated—and then, as always, Congress represented with substantial accuracy the opinion of the majority of the voters—that this country would never again be engaged in war; and therefore, in the midst of such pressing questions as the building of the Western railroads, the resumption of specie payments, the silver question, and the tariff, there was no time to think about the needs of the army. There was no "military situation in the United States" worth thinking about.

From this dream of perpetual peace we were rudely awakened by the war in 1898, in which the loss of life and the expenditure of money were so comparatively small, but of which the consequences to us have been so momentous. Still, our people continued to think that the chances of war were quite remote; and the subject of military preparation a matter of small importance, compared with the regulation of public-service corporations, the control of monopoly, the improvement of our banking system, and the other

great questions pressing hard for consideration upon a very busy people. The events of the last six months, however, have at last opened the eyes of our people to the fact that, while we are comparatively immune from the dangers of war which beset the peoples of Europe, yet we are by no means completely immune. They begin to realize that the "present military situation" is a subject which deserves their consideration, that it is of equal importance—perhaps greater importance—than the federal reserve banking law, the income tax, the Sherman law, the tariff, the extension of our commerce, and the rebuilding of our merchant marine; and therefore it is a subject worthy of calm, serious deliberation.

There is no need of excitement about it, no cause for hysteria. We do not need and will not have in this country an army of 700,000 men, as some ill-balanced enthusiasts demand; we are not compelled to, and we will not, enter the battleship race of England and Germany. England must run this race—or die.

We are not so situated, and it would be supreme folly for us to waste our resources or our thoughts in any such contest. But we do need to give such thought to this matter as is necessary, in order to compel our representatives in Congress so to organize our latent but enormous military strength that no nation shall ever undertake to disturb our security, or attempt to prevent us from working out our great destiny in the pursuits of peace.

One other question I should like to refer to here. Does preparation for war result in preserving peace or in inviting war? Many men of eminence, presidents of universities, leaders of public opinion, have recently asserted that the great conflict which is now devastating Europe has forever disposed of the fallacy that preparation for war helps to preserve peace. In my humble opinion this is a hasty, ill-considered judgment and—if I may say so without offense to these university presidents who are not only my personal friends, but are men justly entitled to lead public opinion and for whom, in common with

thousands of others, I have very great admiration—it is a shallow judgment, due to the mental perturbation naturally arising from contemplation of this most appalling of all catastrophes. The sober truth is that if preparations for war are made with a view to attack and for purposes of conquest, then unquestionably such preparations do lead to counter-preparations on the part of the nation against which the attack is planned; they lead to a race in armaments, ever increasing in magnitude, constantly draining the resources of the people, creating a military caste like that of Germany, which steadily grows more insolent and insulting in all its references to its intended adversary; and at the same time creating in the minds of the taxpayer and the man of business the feeling that the cost of armament is greater than the probable cost of war, and that it were better that the war should come and be done with it, and the air cleared, as by a thunderstorm, so that they can resume their ordinary avocations without this dreadful night-

mare hanging over them; and finally the cataclysm, such as we are now witnessing, does inevitably result. If, on the other hand, these preparations are made, not with any purpose of conquest, but solely to enable a nation to pursue its peaceful development without risk of interference from envious rivals or competitors; and if such preparations are so carefully but economically made (as is easily possible in our case) that even the most powerful nation will think it best, on the whole, not to try military conclusions with us, then I assert without fear of successful contradiction that such preparation does not invite war but does, on the contrary, tend to prevent war; and it does certainly do everything that human foresight can suggest to prevent that horrible calamity. And I should not make this assertion with such vehemence were it not that it has the support of George Washington; who over and over again, on every suitable occasion during the sixteen years between the close of the Revolution and his death in 1799, argued,

with his unrivalled wisdom and with all the force of his strong nature, in the effort to convince his countrymen of the soundness of the views which I have, so imperfectly as compared with him, attempted to express.

Gentlemen, in these days, some people, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, have expressed the opinion that Washington was not only a poor soldier but an indifferent statesman; that he was a man of good character but in public affairs was not much more than a respectable figure-head; that such military reputation as he gained was due simply to the fatuous mistakes of his adversaries; and that his political reputation was due to a skilful use of the thoughts of the great statesmen of the period—the two Adamses, Franklin, Jefferson, and Hamilton.

I do not share these views. As to his military reputation and whether it was deserved or not I have dealt elsewhere, at some length.* I believe that he was one of the great soldiers of history, and that if he had died within a

* "The Revolutionary War." Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1911.

year after the battle of Yorktown, and his military services had not been overshadowed by his transcendent political services, this opinion would be concurred in with substantial unanimity. And I believe, also, as it was generally believed throughout the whole period of the nineteenth century, that he was the greatest statesman of all time; that his was the master mind; and that the two Adamses and Franklin and Jefferson and Hamilton and Madison were only his subordinate coadjutors in devising and organizing this government of which we are so proud, and which for five generations we have held up to the world as a model of good government and as the hope of mankind struggling to free itself from the despotism of the past.

I beseech you, therefore, with all the earnestness that I can command, to study what Washington said and wrote concerning the desirability and the necessity of preparing for war in time of peace. What he said on this subject forms no inconsiderable part of his voluminous writings, which were collected

and printed in 12 volumes by Sparks in 1837, and later in 14 volumes by Worthington C. Ford in 1893. His views on this subject, like the principles of strategy, are eternal. They have not been changed by steam or electricity or the marvellous industrial development of the nineteenth century and the early part of this twentieth century in which we are privileged to live. They are fixed and immutable, far more so than the fabled laws of the Medes and Persians, as to the nature of which no one has any accurate knowledge. Our situation in this year 1915 is as different from our situation at the close of the eighteenth century as it is possible for the human mind to imagine; but the writings of Washington on this question of national defense are just as wise, just as pertinent, just as applicable to-day as they were when they were uttered a century and a quarter ago. I beg of you to go to your public library, get the volumes of Sparks and Ford, and read them with careful attention.

There is no great danger in the present

situation, no danger whatever provided we utilize in a judicious manner a small portion of the enormous resources at our disposal. These resources have hitherto not been so utilized. All that I can hope to do this evening is to convince you of this fact. Once you and other voters are convinced of it, there is no doubt that, with the ordinary common sense which has always characterized this government of ours "by the people," the proper solution of the question will be found. Naturally, the subject appeals more closely in the first instance to the people who live on the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, across which must come our enemies if we are ever to be attacked. But, if the idea takes possession of the people on the seacoasts that this is a matter worth thinking about, the thought will quite rapidly penetrate to the interior, and the people of Chicago and Saint Louis and Kansas City and Denver will be quite as much interested as the people of New York and Boston and Portland. The inhabitants of the interior cities will re-

alize that while they are far beyond the twenty-mile range of the most powerful guns now afloat, yet they are by no means beyond the range of the financial and industrial disaster which will surely overtake them if a landing should be effected in the vicinity of New York or Boston or San Francisco, and either of those cities should be subjected to an indemnity levied according to the methods now in vogue.

Any discussion of our "present military situation" necessarily raises the question whether there is *any* military situation, and if so, why. That means, in plain English, Is there any such danger of our being attacked either on the Atlantic coast or on the Pacific coast, or on the three thousand miles of Canadian boundary line, that ordinary caution and prudence, such caution and prudence as we exercise to prevent a remote but possible disaster in our private business, make it in-

cumbent upon us as plain, sensible people to take measures, first, to prevent such an attack, if it be in our power to prevent it; and secondly, to repel the attack, if we cannot prevent it, and to repel it in such manner that the nation which undertakes it will never attempt it a second time?

There are some of my friends who say to me it is not wise to discuss such matters; it is injudicious to throw lighted matches where there is so much loose powder lying about; by talking about these things we shall bring about the very result we are seeking to avoid. Such is not my view. I do not believe that the ostrich has ever saved its neck by hiding its head in the sand. This question of national defense against remote but still possible dangers is a question that must be met manfully, calmly, prayerfully, if you like; and there is no harm in talking about it, no sense in attempting to disguise it.

Now, the only guide for the future is a study of the past; and, before taking up the subject of our present relations and possible

future relations with the most powerful nations of Europe and of Asia, I should like to call your attention for a moment to the unstable nature of political alliances and international friendships. They are as shifting as the sands of the desert. At the present time our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly and cordial nature. It seems now unthinkable that the two greatest nations which speak the English language should ever be brought into conflict. Yet what has been the history of English alliances? From 1757 to 1763 England was engaged with France in a struggle for the control of the North American continent and of the destiny of India. Under the lead of Chatham—to my mind the most far-sighted, the most conciliatory, and in every way the greatest of English statesmen—"the people of Massachusetts [I am quoting from Trevelyan's most fascinating history] taxed themselves to the amount of two pounds in every three of their year's income for the defense of the British Empire. . . . Massachusetts—so close-fisted against

any attempt to take her money without asking her own consent—gave Pitt £140,000 in 20 months, and loaded herself with debt when the yield from current taxation showed symptoms of dwindling." What is now the State of Maine was then a part of Massachusetts. Do you realize that your ancestors raised 30,000 men to fight in common with the men whom Chatham sent over from England and who decided on the Plains of Abraham the destiny of this continent—that it was to be English and not French?

Peace was proclaimed in 1763. French sovereignty was forever lost on this continent as well as in India, and the success in America was very largely due to the whole-hearted support of the colonies, and particularly those of New England. Only 12 years later the men of Massachusetts shot down the King's soldiers, to the number of 73 killed and 174 wounded, between Concord and Boston; because the royal Governor of Massachusetts had used the King's soldiers in an attempt to enforce an Act of Parliament which taxed them

without their consent. The war begun at Lexington lasted eight and a half years, the most bitter, as it was certainly the most disastrous, war in which England ever engaged. The French were then America's all-important allies. That war settled the question for all time, not only whether the colonists should be taxed without representation, but whether they should be taxed by the British Parliament at all.

The Seven Years' War, however (1757–63), did not settle the score between England and France. This was revived by the French Revolution, and for 23 years, from 1792 to 1815, Great Britain fought a life-and-death struggle against Napoleon. This did finally settle the differences between France and England, and not long after Napoleon's downfall these two nations began to be drawn together in commerce and friendship; in 1854 they were full-fledged allies in a war against Russia. England had by now become convinced that her most dangerous rival was not France, but Russia, and that if Russia should

possess Constantinople, she would have a position of vantage on the flank of the route to India, and would use it to England's injury. To prevent this, England, which had brought on the war, laid down the cardinal principle in the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, that it was necessary that the (unspeakable) Turk should remain in Constantinople and control the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. England induced all the seven nations which signed the treaty, viz., France, Prussia, Russia, Austria, Sardinia, and Sweden, as well as herself, to agree that they would "respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire." By a separate convention, England induced France and Austria to guarantee this integrity and independence, and to consider any infraction of the Treaty of Paris a *casus belli*.

From 1856 until some time after Bismarck formed the Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy, in 1883—that is to say, for the period of nearly a generation—this principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as a means

of preventing access of Russia to the Mediterranean, was the foundation and corner-stone of British diplomacy. But after the Triple Alliance had been formed, France, for self-protection, came to an understanding with Russia; and as the German commerce began to spread to all quarters of the globe; as the German industrial development began to increase by leaps and bounds; as goods "made in Germany" began to undersell British-made goods, not only in the distant markets but also in the British Isles themselves; as Germany began to send insulting messages during the Boer War, during the Algerian and Moroccan developments, and began to publish books in which England was spoken of as a decadent race, a land-robber, possessed of an empire which it had not the courage and ability to defend, England began to see that Germany and not Russia was her most dangerous rival. Her policy then shifted and she, too, came to an understanding with Russia. To-day she is fighting for her very life, with Russia as her most powerful ally; and it seems prob-

able that as a recompense she will at the close of the war acquiesce in the delivery of Constantinople, and the control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, to Russia.

To recapitulate, in the eighteenth century England and her American colonies fought shoulder to shoulder against France. A few years later France and the American colonies fought shoulder to shoulder against England. In the beginning of the nineteenth century England and Germany fought against France, and later England and France fought against Russia. In the twentieth century England, France, and Russia are fighting against Germany—in the most colossal of all wars.

Why is it that nations thus shift their alliances? The answer is, because nations ever have been, are now, and ever will be guided in their dealings with other nations by self-interest and self-interest alone. I am not now speaking my own opinions only; I am again quoting those of George Washington. We Americans have always been governed in our international dealings by self-interest and

self-interest alone. The first conspicuous instance of it occurred in November, 1778. A committee of Congress, in conjunction with the Marquis de LaFayette, and in correspondence with Doctor Franklin at Paris, had drawn up a plan for an attack on Canada, which was to be effected by the combined operations of the United States and France. It was a most delicate situation. We were under enormous obligations to France, and Washington had a peculiarly strong affection for LaFayette, whom, in the absence of a son of his own, he regarded almost as his own son. The plan for the invasion of Canada had been made without consulting Washington. When he heard of it he saw that, as Canada was then denuded of British troops, the expedition would in all probability succeed, and LaFayette would gain great renown; but he saw with equal clearness that if an army under LaFayette's command and composed largely of French troops should cross the frontier, descend the Saint Lawrence, meet a French fleet at Quebec and capture that city,

then French sovereignty would be restored on the American continent. Washington instantly wrote to the president of Congress one of those letters, of which there are so many in the twelve volumes of Sparks, the wisdom of which seems almost superhuman, in which he showed that if French troops entered the city of Quebec, they would probably never leave there. This letter put a quietus on the proposed expedition to Canada. In the letter occurs this sentence, seldom quoted, but to my mind one of the most profound sayings of Washington, as true and as pertinent in this twentieth century as when it was written 136 years ago: "*It is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interests; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it.*"

Now, can we be sure, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the interests of Great Britain and of the United States will always continue to be—as they undoubtedly are now, or were

until a few days ago—such that the existing friendship and even affection shall continue?

Not long ago a cloud came on the horizon. Two ships, the *Dacia* and the *Wilhelmina*, recently belonging to Germany but now flying the flag of the United States, sailed for Europe engaged in what we consider to be lawful commerce. They sailed, if the reports in the public press are correct, with the knowledge and approval of our government. And yet Great Britain courteously, but no less firmly and positively, informed our government prior to the date of sailing that it was her intention to seize these ships by force as they approached the coast of Europe. The ships are now on the ocean, and I do not know how the incident will terminate, but I need hardly say that if Great Britain should seize two ships flying the American flag, a situation of no little delicacy would arise. I shall say no more of this because under existing circumstances the less said the better; but I think you ought to consider whether in case Great Britain and the United States

lock horns on any such question which each party considers vital to its interests, and if neither side yields, then the friendship of a hundred years, of which we have recently talked so much and of which we are justly proud, might vanish overnight.

We all hope and pray that our relations of peace and friendly competition with Great Britain may always continue; but we are not justified in building our plans on hopes. If England comes triumphant out of this war, she will not allow her subjects to be killed, and their property to be wrecked, in Mexico, and let it go with a flippant remark that her subjects went there to make money and they took the risks. That is not the way that England has treated her people, as they have spread to the four quarters of the globe. She will more probably say to us: "You restore order in Mexico, or we will." And if England goes to Mexico to restore order, she may not retire, as we did from Cuba. So that we will either have to eat our Monroe Doctrine or intervene in Mexico for an indefinite pe-

riod. Nor is this the only cloud that may come between our good friends in England and ourselves. If England comes out of this war victorious, she will be more than ever mistress of the seas; she will, with redoubled energy, seek to extend her commerce on every continent in order to recover the loss and damage of the war. We also are seeking to extend our commerce and to sell our manufactured goods in every quarter of the globe. Therein, according to the judgment of our wisest men of affairs, lies the future prosperity of this country. Is there no chance that the two great nations may clash in this competition? Thanks to the skill of Hamilton Fish and William M. Evarts, loyally supported by President Grant, in 1871, we arbitrated the *Alabama* claims with entire satisfaction to both sides; later, in 1907, thanks to the genius and forensic ability of Elihu Root, we arbitrated the fishery disputes, which had more than once brought us to the verge of war during the hundred years that they had remained unsettled. But the skill of Jef-

ferson, Madison, and Monroe, all ardent advocates of peace and of the futility of preparation for war, were insufficient to keep us from going to war with England in 1812 over the question of the impressment of our seamen. So that, looking at the history of England for the last 160 years, I think we are not justified in believing that the present happy relations between the two great English-speaking peoples are so certain to continue that it is not necessary to give any thought to what we should do in the unhappy contingency that they might be broken. It was Cromwell who said: "Put your trust in God but mind to keep your powder dry." That was a homely but sound maxim of your ancestors. We no longer have to keep our powder dry, because we keep it in a metallic case, but we do have to take equally prudent precautions.

Next, is there no risk that Germany may some day attack us? If she should come out victorious from this war—which seems hardly possible, and yet she has already accomplished

marvels of impossibility—Germany would probably not ask us to restore order in Mexico, but would calmly announce that she intended to restore order there herself and did not need our assistance in the matter. As ancillary to this undertaking she would promptly buy from Denmark the island of Saint Thomas, which has the finest harbor in the West Indies. For 45 years, since the first term of General Grant's administration, we have steadily refused to purchase it for ourselves and as steadily refused to allow any one else to buy it; although Denmark has been ready and anxious at every moment in that long period to sell. The adjacent island of Santa Cruz, which she owns, would be thrown in without extra expense, for both islands are of no use to Denmark, and the profits on their administration at the end of every year are written in red figures. Germany has hitherto respected our wish that these islands should not be acquired by any European nation; but, if she is victorious in this war, it needs no prophet to say that this

wish of ours may no longer be respected. If Germany is defeated in this war, her wishes as to Mexico and the West Indian islands and the Panama Canal will have to be postponed; but let us not base any plans on the theory that Germany can be so crushed that she will never again undertake offensive military operations. The advocates of peace express the bloodthirsty wish that this may be accomplished; that the war may continue until Germany is not only brought to her knees, but so devastated, maimed, and crippled that not for a hundred years can she again go to war; and they justify their wish by saying that only so can universal peace be ushered in and the United States of Europe established, with an International Supreme Court sitting constantly at The Hague to hear and decide their differences and an International Army to enforce its decrees. But, my friends, do not be deceived: that is not "in the womb of time"; it cannot be done. When the war is over Germany will still be the second naval power in the world, stronger than ourselves

in battleships, and possessed of an ocean-going commerce with a tonnage nearly five times as great as our own. In little more than one generation, from 1872 to 1914, Germany has built up her merchant marine from 989,000 tons to 4,900,000 tons, an increase of fivefold. Germany possesses the only three ships in the world having a tonnage each exceeding 50,000 tons. The combined tonnage of the Hamburg-American, North German Lloyd, and Hamburg South American lines is 2,311,000. The combined tonnage of the Cunard, White Star, British India, and Peninsular and Oriental lines is only 1,960,000 tons. By far the greater part of the German tonnage has been created within the space of a single generation. The Germans manufacture ships of the very highest quality at about 60 per cent of what they cost us; they operate these ships at an expense of about 80 per cent of what we have to pay. So long as the scale of wages continues what it now is, and probably will continue to be, in this country, there is no ground to expect

that we can ever rival Germany in the ocean-carrying trade. Even if during the present war England should succeed in practically destroying all of the existing German ships, neither England nor any other nation can destroy German efficiency, German stout-heartedness, German brains, and German industrial skill. If her whole commercial fleet is wiped out, it will only be a few years before German ships will again be seen on every one of the seven seas. In support of this we have only to consider how rapidly France recovered from the appalling disasters of 1870 and the crushing financial burdens which were then laid upon her by her victorious opponent. We have only to consider the state of absolute desolation in which the South found itself in 1865, and the prosperity which it had already regained less than 10 years later.

Now, what are the German ideas about the possibility of Germany's picking a quarrel with us and sending troops across the sea to settle it? Let me read you something from

a very interesting little book* published in Germany some years ago, the publication of which, so it is said, was suppressed at the outbreak of this war; but a translation was recently made from copies which escaped hither, and it has been published in New York within the last few months. Its author is or was a member of the German General Staff and the title of his book is "Operations Upon the Sea." This is his opinion as to the possibility of operations against the United States. He says (p. 92):

"As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great power which is in a position to conquer the United States. England could, of course, carry out a successful attack upon the sea, but she would not be prepared to protect her Canadian provinces, with which the Americans could compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. None of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to attempt an invasion."

* "Operations Upon the Sea. A Study." By Freiherr von Edelsheim, in the service of the German General Staff in 1901. Translated from the German. New York: The Outdoor Press, 1914.

And again (p. 86):

"With that country, in particular, political friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. However, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force in order to combat the encroachment of the United States upon our interests.* Our main factor here is our

* Many people have expressed astonishment that the German Government allowed the publication of Bernhardi's book, which so accurately forecasted the events of last August, and similarly as to this book of von Edelsheim. The latter deals solely with a military problem, whereas Bernhardi's "Next War" deals with many other than strictly military subjects; but as to military projects von Edelsheim's book is to sea operations what von Bernhardi's book is to land operations. The officers of our army and navy are forbidden to discuss such topics in public, either in speech or writing. How in the world did Germany allow such books to be published?

The answer is found in the difference in the environment. In Germany several thousand military books are published every year; in English-speaking countries several scores at the most. German officers are encouraged to discuss military topics, and they do not hesitate to face the facts and call a spade a spade. Moreover, it is probable that the German Chancellor was often in need of Socialist votes to pass his appropriation bills for the army and navy, and that

fleet. Our battle fleet has every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the United States, widely dispersed over the two oceans. It is certain that after the defeat of the United States fleet, the great extension of unprotected coast-line and [of the] powerful resources of that country would compel them to make peace."

His little book is an elaboration of his ideas of how the operations should be conducted, in order, as he says, "to carry out our purpose with force"; and of an exhortation to the members of the General Staff and his other comrades in arms not to neglect this overseas problem in the study of the many problems

it was necessary for them to be instructed as to the "encroachments" of other nations, and to be convinced by military experts that they would get their money's worth if they voted for the expenditure. Finally, a possible psychological explanation: When Bismarck represented Prussia in the Diet at Frankfort, he conceived the idea that his colleagues who represented the other states in the North German Confederation conducted their negotiations by lying and deceit. Thereafter he invariably told the truth, and thereby outwitted them. The story is given by Busch, who was to Bismarck as Boswell to Johnson. Possibly Bismarck's disciples—not only the authors, but the Chancellors—acted on the same principle.

with which they are charged, but to make their plans and to work out in time of peace all necessary preparations, so that when the transatlantic war begins it can be prosecuted with as much celerity as, let me say, the mobilization of August, 1914, and the advance through Belgium to the vicinity of Paris. I have no doubt that Freiherr von Edelsheim's advice has been carefully followed, that the project for a war with the United States, in successive units of, say, 240,000 men each, has all been made, docketed, and put away in the appropriate pigeonhole, in the office of the German General Staff at Berlin, until it shall be called for. I confess to an intense curiosity (which is not likely to be satisfied) to see this document. In the absence of that I shall later on give you a summary of so much of Baron von Edelsheim's plans as he has disclosed in his most interesting little book.

I dismiss all consideration of a "war" with Mexico. Circumstances may make it necessary for us to do some arduous, expensive, and difficult police work in that turbulent

country. If we have to do it, it will be as easily within our means as was the settlement of our dispute with Spain in 1898; and the result of pacifying and establishing stable government in that land of marvellous resources which has been distracted by revolutions throughout the hundred years since it declared its independence of Spain, will be worth far more than what it costs; but it would not be war in the sense of what we are now discussing.

On the Pacific, however, there is a remote possibility of war—in my humble judgment, far more remote than the contingency of war on the Atlantic coast, and it will not happen except as a result of our own insolence, our own disregard of our treaties, or our own inability to compel the sovereign States which form the portion of our Union bordering on the Pacific Ocean to legislate in conformity to the treaties which the Federal Government has made. I reach this opinion, viz., that the possibility of war with Japan is in the highest degree remote, for various reasons.

In the first place, Japan owes her entrance into the family of nations to us. All her statesmen, on all proper occasions, express their gratitude for this, and their belief that this gratitude and its resulting friendship will be perpetual. Some people doubt the sincerity of this, but I do not. In the second place, the Elder Statesmen who control the affairs of Japan are among the wisest of the men who guide the destinies of nations. They have no delusions. They are more concerned with actualities than with rhetoric; more interested in studying facts than in making phrases. They realize that while possibly in the beginning of the struggle they might have an advantage over us, the end of it would be disastrous to them. It would set them back where they were when Perry opened their doors by the treaty of March 31, 1854. They are not willing that the enormous strides which they have made in shipping and foreign commerce and inland industry during the last twenty years, since they discharged with courteous thanks most

if not all of their foreign teachers, shall be jeopardized. They appreciate that as to us their resources and wealth are as dimes to dollars.* But, on the other hand, no prouder race exists on the face of the earth, no nation which has more venerable traditions of which it justly has the right to be proud. Their courtesy and tact in dealing with foreign nations lose nothing by comparison with those of the French, whose language is the language of diplomacy. Now, the Japanese people, whose influence in their government daily grows, as the influence of their statesmen by comparison relatively diminishes, understand that in our government the Constitution says that treaties made in pursuance thereof, and duly ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate, are the supreme law of the land; the people of Japan, as self-government increases, and as they study more and more the workings of other governments, cannot comprehend how, when a State, a

* National wealth of the United States, $150,000,000,000; national wealth of Japan, $12,000,000,000, or 8 per cent.—*World Almanac*, 1915.

portion of the United States, enacts legislation in contravention of such a treaty, all that the President of the United States can do about it is to send his Secretary of State out to make a speech to that legislature and entreat it not to enact such legislation; and still further, they cannot appreciate how a Secretary of State sent on such an errand should return with his errand a complete failure. Nor do they think that it is their business to try to understand such relations between a State and the United States of which it is a part. They simply stand on their treaty, as they have a right to; and they have stood there now for several years, with an exhibition of self-control, of dignity, and of confidence in the righteousness of their claim and an unshaken belief that we will make our word good, which may well be commended to our careful consideration. The half-educated politicians of California, when they think of the Japanese as "heathen," should open their Bibles, turn to II Corinthians 3:6, and ponder carefully what Paul,

the greatest of all Christian teachers, when writing "to obviate the charge of vainglory," said: "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." The California legislators have tried to "beat" the treaty. Perhaps they have succeeded. If so, let them not imagine that Japan will let it go at that. Their statesmen insist, and they are within their rights, legal, equitable, and moral, in so insisting, that they shall be treated as we treat other great nations; and they have the ability, when all diplomatic methods have been exhausted, to compel us so to treat them. For it seems hardly conceivable, when the people of this country fully understand this proposition—as Elihu Root and James Brown Scott and Hamilton Holt understand it—that 95,000,000 people will allow themselves to be dragged into a senseless and wrongful war at the behest of 5,000,000 people, who seem to be hopelessly wrong on this question.

The only question which can make trouble between us and Japan is the question of how long her endurance will last, how long her

self-control will continue. If war comes with Japan, it will be "made in America."

I do not mean by this that the attack will be made by us. If as a result of our supreme folly in dealing with Japan as we do not deal with other nations the Japanese shall be goaded into war with us regardless of its ultimate consequences to them, the first blow would probably be struck by Japan before any declaration of war; it would be dealt with a swiftness and a certainty of which our people have no conception, and according to a definite plan carefully prepared in advance. Three days will see their battleships in the Philippines, and ten days* in the Hawaiian Islands, unless our battleships meet and destroy theirs on the way. Their ships would not attack Manila because the fortifications of Corregidor are impregnable. But there are no fortifications on Lingayen Bay on the north, Balayan Bay on the south, or Lamon Bay on the east. A landing at either

* The distance from the Japanese naval station on the Island Sea to Lingayen Gulf is 1,400 nautical miles, and to Honolulu, 3,500 nautical miles.

of these points presents no difficulties, and once landed it is but a few days' march to the rear of Manila. The roads are excellent, as good as those of New York or Massachusetts. I know about them because they have been built by my son, who is the Director of Public Works, and he has sent me many photographs of them (with the automobiles flying along just within the speed limit as they do with us) and of the graceful bridges of reinforced concrete which span the streams.

Our flag will not come down on Corregidor, but Manila, Cebu, Iloilo, and the other principal cities would all be in possession of the enemy within 30 days after the declaration of war, if there was one, or the sailing of the Japanese battleships through Shimonoseki Straits, if there was none—unless we had a mobile army large enough to defeat the invading army; as a matter of fact, we have, according to the report of the Secretary of War, 9,600 men in the Philippines, and as a matter of opinion, if the Japanese ever attack us there they will do it with 100,000 men.

They have ample tonnage of ships to carry that number.

Similarly, there are excellent fortifications in some of the harbors of the Hawaiian Islands; but, also, there are landing-places where there are no fortifications and from which the cities can be attacked in the rear. Honolulu is much nearer to San Francisco (2,089 nautical miles) than to Kobe or Yokohama, so that perhaps we might reinforce our garrison of 8,200 men (provided we have a mobile army) before the enemy could arrive. But in any event there will be a great naval battle and probably a great land battle before the fate of the Hawaiian Islands would be settled.

So that, perhaps, when these facts become known to our people as clearly as they are now known to the Japanese people, we may think that it becomes us to treat the Japanese with the same politeness that they treat us and that we show to other nations.

I shall say nothing about Alaska, with its thousands of miles of unprotected coast-line, its enormously valuable coal-mines, and its

great National Railway, the construction of which is about to be undertaken. We have, according to the report of the Secretary of War, exactly 862 men in Alaska. There are no fortifications on its coast. Nor shall I say anything about the 1,200 miles of coast-line of the 3 great Pacific States of Washington, Oregon, and California. The principal harbors are protected by strong, modern, up-to-date fortifications; but unless we have a mobile army superior to that of a possible invader these fortifications will not prevent a landing between harbors and the capture of one or more of the great cities by an attack from the rear. If by their ill-considered and short-sighted legislation the people of these 3 States force their countrymen into an unnecessary war with Japan they will be the chief sufferers. I shall not go into the details of these matters, which affect us more closely than anything that can happen at Manila or Honolulu. I have already said enough, I think, to show that it behooves us to treat Japan on the basis of the most-favored nation.

That is the solemn obligation of our treaty. We are railing at others for breaking their treaties. Are we observing our own? If not, then this proud and sensitive race, under repeated provocations, may possibly work themselves into a frame of mind in which they will prefer national death to national dishonor; and in the dying they may deal us a wound more deep than we now imagine.

And now having stated, I fear at too great length, the possibilities, more or less remote, of attack from the only three nations whose attack would be serious, I want to say a few words about the immutability of man, or at least the approach to immutability involved in the fact that his nature changes with such fabulous slowness. And I speak of this because man's nature is of fundamental importance in considering whether there will be more wars in the near future or whether, as

a result of the present unprecedented conflict, universal peace is a possibility worthy of practical consideration. Doubtless man's nature does slowly change, but only on the scale used by the Psalmist when he said that "a thousand years in the sight of the Lord are but as yesterday when it is passed, and as a watch in the night." We hear much of "progress" in these days; but the human body has not improved in size nor in form since the days of Phidias; the human mind is certainly not more acute nor more profound than it was in the days of Aristotle; the human heart is much the same as it was in the days of Solomon and David, three thousand years ago; it has the same passions, noble and ignoble, the same lofty aspirations, the same frailties and backslidings. Man is now and ever has been, and I believe long will be, a fighting animal. There is great talk nowadays of arbitration, and undoubtedly there are many differences which can be and have been wisely arbitrated; and, equally without doubt, there are many quar-

rels between nations which cannot be arbitrated. If the suggested United States of Europe can be established, I do not see how, man's nature being what it is, civil war can with certainty be prevented. The greatest United States which the world has ever known, the model on which the United States of Europe must be patterned, if it is ever to be, had been in successful and even splendid operation for 72 years; it had its Supreme Court with well-defined powers and administered by jurists of unsurpassed abilities; its Constitution required it to guarantee to every State a republican form of government; it maintained an army and a militia in order to fulfil its constitutional obligation to suppress rebellion, and to repress internal disorder in cases where the individual States were unable to perform this primary function of all government. And yet in these United States, whose government was rightfully claimed to be the last word in administration, the highest product of the human mind in that noblest of all arts, the art of government, a Civil War broke out which proved

to be the greatest conflict of modern times prior to the war now raging in Europe, and which continued until at the end of four terrible years one party to the controversy was, as a government, absolutely annihilated. If that happened in "the best government on earth," administered by a race whose knowledge and experience of self-government goes back through the centuries of the Declaration of Independence, British Parliament, and Magna Charta to the Witenagemot which the Angles brought from the Rhine to Britain in the fifth century, how can a new and loosely formed confederation, composed of peoples who speak five different languages, who range the whole gamut of civilization from the highest art and literature to the lowest depth of ignorance and backwardness, whose laws are drawn from entirely different roots of thought, and whose religions, among those of them who still have any religious belief at all, have nothing in common except a very diversified belief in Jesus Christ—how can such a loosely formed confederation expect to be immune

from civil war? The suggestion is made that the nations shall disarm, except for an international army which shall enforce the decrees of the court at The Hague. The futility of this is evident. In 1861 both the North and South were disarmed. Before the end of the year a million and a half were fighting in the ranks.

No, gentlemen, it does not look as if this scheme of the United States of Europe had been thoroughly thought out. I fear it will not work; that it is an "iridescent dream."

As to the ability and competence of man to decide such fundamental differences as have brought on this greatest of all conflicts: I, for one, do not undertake to pass judgment upon the motives of the nations now at war, nor to attempt to decide which of them is right and which of them is wrong in their contentions. I do not believe that it is within the scope of finite intelligence to decide such a deep-rooted controversy. But I do believe that it is within the scope of Infinite Intelligence to pass upon the merits of the

dispute, and to decide it aright. There are some people old-fashioned and simple-minded enough—I am one of them—to believe that there is a God of Battles, who uses war as an agency to accomplish his beneficent purposes, and to settle disputes which man, unaided, cannot settle. Where would we have been in a court of arbitration, if there had been one, in 1775, when we shot down the King's soldiers? And in 1776, when we declared our independence? Parliament had the right to tax us without representation, if it was foolish enough to do so. But courts of arbitration, like other courts, must deal with rights, as they exist in law or equity; such courts cannot take into consideration any "higher law," or any aspirations for freedom. If we had appealed to a court of arbitration at that time, we should have been non-suited, and summarily thrown out of court. What carried us into war was sympathy with Patrick Henry's declaration: "Give me liberty or give me death!" Courts of arbitration do not take cognizance of any

such appeals. If our quarrel with our kinsfolk in Great Britain had been arbitrated, we should surely have lost, and we would to-day be British colonies like Canada and Australia. Does any one seriously claim that that would be better than our present status, or that the struggle of the eight long years of the Revolution was not worth all that it cost in blood and treasure?

Similarly, in 1861, if there had been a Hague Court and the North and the South had gone there to plead their differences, the North would have said: We are opposed to the extension of slavery; and the South would have answered: That issue has already been settled in the Dred Scott case by the Supreme Court of the United States. The North would have said: We are in favor of the maintenance of the Union and of compelling States to remain in the Union against their will; the South would have replied: Read your Constitution; show us any article in it which authorizes you to compel us to stay in the Union when we want to go out; as wit-

nesses, we cite Madison, who was so largely instrumental in drawing up the Constitution, and Jefferson, who took so prominent a part in putting it into operation; does any one know better than they what the Constitution means? And what did they say about it in 1798?

Does any rational man believe that the North would have won its case in such an arbitration? The question answers itself. But in the terrible war which followed, the North did win its case; and the South is now as enthusiastic as the North in acquiescing in the decision made by the dread arbitrament of war.

Again, in 1898 the Congress of the United States passed, without a dissenting voice, a joint resolution reading as follows: "The Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters." Suppose we had sent our most em-

inent jurists to The Hague and had asked for a decree that the international police force be sent to Cuba to enforce this demand, what would the great lawyers of England, France, Germany, Russia, and other countries, sitting in the beautiful Palace of Peace, have said to our plea? They must of necessity have decided that our plea was preposterous. In that case Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines would have continued under Spanish misgovernment, and the colonial system of Spain would still be tottering in its decrepitude. Does any one believe that that would have been a better solution than the solution which was brought about by war, under which the peoples in these islands are now well advanced on the high road of self-government, prosperity, and happiness? And as for the losses in battle during those brief but all-important one hundred days, they were no greater than the number killed and injured on our own railroads during the same period.

Turn again to 1846. If ever there was a

war conceived in sin and born in iniquity, it was the war with Mexico. If we had tried to arbitrate this, we would not have had a leg to stand on; and yet through the workings of an inscrutable and Divine Providence, this wicked war resulted in bringing good government throughout a territory of almost untold wealth, about 1,000,000 square miles in extent, now inhabited by nearly 10,000,000 of contented people; whereas but for the war this vast territory would now be in a state of anarchy and chaos, similar to that which exists to-day in the contiguous states of Chihuahua and Sonora.

Finally, it is possible, though by no means certain, and, in fact, quite doubtful, that if we had arbitrated our quarrel with Great Britain in 1812 we might have won our case; but it was not our grievances against Great Britain —the impressment of our seamen, the occupation of our western posts, and the interference with our commerce through paper blockades and preposterous "Orders-in-Council"—just as these grievances undoubtedly

were, which drove us into war. It was the fiery speech of young Henry Clay on his accession to the Senate at the age of 34, by which he swept Madison, an ardent advocate of peace, and the whole country off their feet, by stating that we had a right to demand that Great Britain should relinquish her sovereignty over any and all parts of this continent; that our citizen soldiers would cross the frontier at Niagara and Plattsburg, march down the Saint Lawrence to Quebec, brushing aside the Canadians and the few soldiers which in the agony of her conflict with Napoleon Great Britain could then send to Canada, and at Quebec we would dictate a peace which would forever dispose of any pretensions of Great Britain to exercise authority on this continent. Henry Clay proved a bad prophet; and, in the treaty which he himself signed at Ghent 100 years ago last month, not only did Great Britain retain her sovereignty in Canada, which she still maintains, but not one of the things for which we went to war was so much as men-

tioned in the treaty. Nevertheless, Great Britain did at an early day evacuate our posts, and she never again attempted to impress our seamen or to issue "Orders-in-Council" designed to destroy our foreign commerce. The result of the War of 1812 was to give us commercial freedom, as the Revolution had given us political freedom.

In addition to the questions of arbitration, and of man's nature as affecting the probability of war, I desire for a moment to call your attention to the relative advantages for its inhabitants of a great and powerful nation as compared with a small nation which cannot indulge in the extravagance of great armaments.

A very able book was written a few years ago by Norman Angell called, "The Great Illusion." Thousands of copies of it have been sold, it has been translated into several foreign languages, and must have had, as

it deserved, several million readers. It was written from the economic standpoint, and was intended to prove that war does not terminate the dispute; that private property still exists in a conquered province; that the payment of the huge indemnity by France to Germany was of benefit to France rather than to Germany, because Germany spent the money in wasteful extravagance which brought on a financial panic, whereas France by enforced economy and her traditional thrift soon got the money back in payment for the products of her industry; that not many years later France was able to loan huge sums to Germany and in the Moroccan crisis she called her German loans and forced Germany to settle that question in accordance with her views. In support of his theory, which many men of the first rank in finance and business have pronounced unanswerable, he quoted the prices of national securities and cited the fact, which at that time was indisputable, that the bonds of the smaller countries like Switzerland and Denmark and

Sweden which were not wasting their resources in ruinous armaments commanded a far higher price in the markets of the world than those of Germany, France, or England. He argued that the might and power of these nations created an illusion; and, in particular, he cited the case of Belgium, whose bonds then sold at a higher price than those of any other nation in Europe. He referred to this hive of industry, whose people lived contentedly without a great army and with practically no navy, the neutrality of their state and the stability of their government guaranteed by the three great nations, and he proved to his own satisfaction, and that of thousands of readers, that the condition of the Belgian, whose government did not aspire to rule one-sixth or one-fourth of the people of the world and did not have to maintain the great navies and armies which are necessary to such a position, was far happier in every way than that of the groaning taxpayer in the larger countries.

His whole argument rested on the corner-

stone of the inviolability of treaties, and alas! when in August the neutrality treaties became mere scraps of paper and were thrown to the wind in what were supposed to be the exigencies of a great power, at the beginning of its campaign, his whole thesis fell to the ground like a house of cards. There are no quotations now on Belgian bonds, except such as are guaranteed by England; and private property in Belgium has almost ceased to exist, burned up and battered down by a mighty conqueror.

Following the fashion of the day, Mr. Angell invented a phrase in order to attract attention to his thoughts: "The Great Illusion." The sad fact is that Mr. Angell was himself the victim of an illusion, to wit: that treaties are sacred and inviolable. Few wars have been fought that did not involve the violation of antecedent treaties.

I trust that I have given you some ground to doubt whether this much-vaunted arbitration is the cure-all that its friends claim;

whether the fortune of being part of a small neutralized state is as good as it was thought to be; and—man's nature being substantially what it has been for at least 3,000 years, and what it will long continue to be—whether war is, or soon will be, a thing of the past. We have, therefore, a "military situation" in these United States, to wit: It is conceivable that we may be attacked by one, or possibly by two, of three great powers. In case through their fault or through ours—and we are not always or inevitably free from fault in our dealings with other nations—a conflict should arise, how would they go about it, and what would or should we do to repel the attack and successfully maintain our side of the controversy?

The issue, in the first instance, would depend upon the control of the sea. Great Britain now maintains a navy of size and force equal to that of any other two nations combined, Germany and the United States included. In my judgment this condition will continue during the longest life of the

youngest of children now born. When England ceases to maintain such a navy her name will no longer be England, but some synonym for Venice, Spain, or Holland, each of which in turn was at one time mistress of the seas. We are no longer the second naval power, but the third; and if the views of the arbitrationists prevail, we shall soon be the fourth or fifth. In any event, we cannot expect to have a larger navy than Germany. If, in some controversy about the Panama Canal or our foreign commerce, the self-interest of Great Britain and the self-interest of Germany should coincide, and should be adverse to the self-interest of the United States, then these two nations would unite to coerce us; they would again be allies as they were under Chatham and under his great son, the younger Pitt. In that event we should be opposed by a naval force more than three times as great as our own, and should be hopelessly outclassed. The allies would have no trouble in crossing the ocean and selecting such a point for landing as the General Staffs of the

two countries should decide to be most favorable to their plans. If Great Britain alone should be our antagonist in a conflict which the resources of diplomacy and arbitration could not prevent, there would be practically the same result, for I cannot conceive that we shall ever have a navy as large as Great Britain *must* have. If Germany alone should attack us, we might be inferior at sea; in any event the best we could hope for would be to fight the German navy on equal terms. We might be defeated in such an engagement; and, if we were victorious, we would be so crippled that the control of the sea would not be in our hands, even if it was not in the hands of the Germans.

Until this war no German battleship had, so far as I know, been engaged in battle. The German navy has no splendid traditions such as the British navy has in Trafalgar, the Nile, Copenhagen, and Saint Vincent's, no names of great naval commanders on the pages of its history like those of Nelson, Jervis, Howe, Collingwood, Keppel, and Rodney. But in

this, Germany's first naval war, she has set a new record in the feats of submarines and cruisers; and in the battles of the south Pacific, the south Atlantic, and the North Sea she has shown that she is no mean antagonist for England. The natives of the Baltic and North Sea provinces have sailed the seas for centuries; they are good seamen in every sense of the word. The great commercial ships of Germany are navigated with a skill, and commanded with a discipline, not excelled by any other nation in the world. If any one thinks that the Germans cannot fight on the sea as well as they do on the land, he makes a great mistake.

I assume, therefore, that if the Germans ever attempt to cross the Atlantic with an army, they will succeed. Will they be able to land? First, let me correct, or endeavor to correct, a popular error in regard to the function performed by the modern fortifications which, thanks to the sound judgment and wise advice of Samuel J. Tilden, now protect all our great cities. They have been

built at a cost of nearly $160,000,000, and have been more than 20 years in the building. They do adequately serve their purpose of protecting these great cities—your own among them—from attack by sea. Without them, the battleships of any foreign nation could approach the harbor of Portland or any other harbor, send their torpedo-boats ahead to sweep the channels clear of mines, as the Coast Survey vessels now sweep the harbors to find submerged rocks, and forthwith capture the city without any loss to themselves. These fortifications being in existence, armed with the most modern cannon, and manned by a sufficient number of skilled gunners, this thing cannot be done. But from Portland to Portsmouth there is a stretch of about 50 miles in which there are no fortifications; from Portsmouth to Boston, a similar stretch; from Boston around to Newport, a still longer piece of unfortified coast; from Montauk Point to Coney Island and from Sandy Hook to Cape May, similar stretches of sandy beach, each more than 100 miles in length, in which there

are no fortifications, and no possibility of putting on these long sand strips any guns of size to match those of battleships. The nearest city in the United States to the mouth of the Kiel Canal is your own city of Portland. Suppose that the German General Staff should decide that, all things considered, Portland would be the best place to attack in the first instance with a view to establishing a naval base in your fine and capacious harbor. They would not come to Portland direct, but would go, say, to Kennebunkport, where last summer I have seen the sea as calm as the Great Lakes; land there, quickly seize the railroads at Kennebunk, West Kennebunk, and Sanford so as to prevent any United States troops from coming from Boston, and then march down the fine automobile road—less than a 2 days' march—attack Portland from the rear, capture it, and seize your principal citizens as hostages for the payment of a large indemnity; as was recently done in Brussels and other Belgian cities. Would not that be an interesting "military situa-

tion"? Some people may think that it would be difficult to land from the open ocean on an open beach. Listen to what our friend von Edelsheim has to say on that subject (p. 62): "Military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold landing is never successful." When I first read this dictum I was disposed to question its accuracy, but in looking back at the list of overseas expeditions during the last 140 years I can find no case which disproves his statement. In the days of sailing-ships, Howe landed on Long Island in 1776, Napoleon landed in Egypt in 1778, and Scott landed at Vera Cruz in 1847. In the days of steam, the English, French, and Sardinians landed in the Crimea in 1854, the troops of the United States landed on Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898, the allies landed at Taku in 1900; and there have been various minor landings during the last 140 years. I do not believe that von Edelsheim's dogma can be successfully disputed.

Let me at once, however, allay your ap-

prehensions by saying that I do not believe that the German General Staff would select Portland as their point of attack. I believe that they would instantly strike at the vitals of our trade, commerce, industrial and financial system—that is, at New York. Pending an inspection of the overseas project—which, as I have previously said, is doubtless quietly reposing, docketed and indexed, in its proper pigeonhole in the office of the General Staff in Berlin—I venture to suggest that this is the plan which would probably be adopted: viz., a fleet of transports composed of ships not less than 10,000 nor more than 50,000 tons in size, with speed of not less than 18 knots, properly escorted by battleships and scout cruisers, and carrying about 15 divisions—say, 240,000 infantry, with the proper complement of artillery, cavalry, and engineers—and having on the decks of these ships an ample supply of aeroplanes, would sail from Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Hamburg, Glückstadt, Emden, and Kiel, and in about 10 days—longer, perhaps, if there was a great

naval battle on the way—would arrive off the Long Island coast somewhere between Montauk Point and Coney Island, and probably quite near those beautiful houses where some of my dearest friends live at Southampton. The ground would be reconnoitred by the aeroplanes, and then the torpedo-boats, the scout cruisers, and in the background the battleships, would close in toward the shore and with their guns protect the landing. Once landed, the march would begin for Long Island City; and unless we had a mobile army of at least equal strength, equally trained, and commanded by equally skilful officers, this march would not take more than 4 days. Arrived in the boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn, it is possible that our people would destroy those splendid bridges crossing the East River, which have been constructed at an expense of $89,400,000, and which are the admiration of engineers the world over.*

* Brooklyn Bridge, $22,400,000; Manhattan Bridge, $26,000,000; Williamsburg Bridge, $23,100,000; Queensboro Bridge, $17,900,000.—*World Almanac*, 1914.

If the bridges should be destroyed, the passage over to Manhattan would be delayed, but not stopped. There are no forts between Staten Island and Fort Schuyler (where the East River joins Long Island Sound), a distance of more than 20 miles, nor is it possible to have any forts in this, the most densely populated spot on the face of the globe. The passage of the East River would present no great difficulties; and, once in Manhattan, discreet officers would at once be sent to find John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, J. P. Morgan, George F. Baker, Jacob H. Schiff, Frank A. Vanderlip, W. K. Vanderbilt, Henry C. Frick, Vincent Astor, and Harry Payne Whitney; or, if these men were no longer living, they would seek those who, at the time of the invasion, would occupy the commanding position in the world of affairs which these gentlemen now fill. These ten men would be taken in military automobiles to the headquarters of the commanding general and there placed in close confinement until they signed a bond, conditioned upon the payment,

either by the city of New York or by the United States, or by both, of an indemnity of not less than $5,000,000,000; say, about twice the cost of our Civil War, exclusive of pensions. Would they sign it? Most assuredly they would. They are all astute men of affairs, and it would be bad business for them to do anything else. The indemnity of $5,000,000,000 compared with the resources of the United States at the present time would not be excessive, as compared with the indemnity of $1,000,000,000 which France was compelled to pay in 1871.* And yet, to the last day of his life, Bismarck regretted that he had not made Thiers sign for more.

You all know the story of dear old Blücher, that hot-headed but simple-minded old man (he was then 73 years old) who helped Wellington to win the battle of Waterloo. After Napoleon had been sent to Saint Hel-

* According to Mulhall, the national wealth of France in 1870 was $34,652,000,000. The World Almanac for 1915 gives the national wealth of the United States at $150,000,000,000.

ena, Blücher came to England as the guest of the nation, and in accordance with the usual custom he was given the freedom of the City of London in a gold box and invited to a dinner at the Mansion House. He rode in the carriage with Wellington along the old established route from Westminster, past Trafalgar Square, where the Nelson column and Landseer's splendid lions were not yet in place, but where the pathetic statue of Charles I had already been erected—a statue as pathetic as the fate of poor Charles himself—then on through the Strand, past Somerset House, the Temple and the Inns of Court, with all their wealth of historical associations, to Temple Bar—where not even the Sovereign of England might pass without the consent of the Lord Mayor—on through Fleet Street, redolent with the memories of Johnson, up Ludgate Hill and past Saint Paul's, whose splendid dome and massive foundations were as impressive then as now; around Saint Paul's churchyard, through Cheapside and the Poultry to Mansion House Square.

As they rode along through the applauding multitudes which lined the streets, doubtless Wellington—although there was not much of the sentimental in his make-up—pointed out to Blücher the historical memories and the associations of these ancient thoroughfares. All this made no impression upon Blücher; but when he arrived in sight of the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange, and the Mansion House, he was filled with awe at the visions of such wealth; his face lighted up as he turned to Wellington and exclaimed: "*Was für Plunder!*"—What a place for loot!* And yet the entire value of all London from the Abbey to the Bank, in 1815, was less than the value of the property, real and personal, fixed and incorporeal, within half a mile of the United States subtreasury on Manhattan Island.

* It is so many years since I first heard this story that I cannot remember its origin. I do not vouch for its accuracy, but I have heard it so many times, told by men who had passed much of their life in London, and it so accords with Blücher's well-known character and early life, that I cannot but believe that it has some foundation in fact. At all events *e ben trovato.*

Yes, you can be very sure that the ten hostages would sign the bond.*

I fancy I hear some one say under his breath: What a fantastic picture! as baseless as the fabric of a dream. No! if we are not adequately prepared for defense it is no more fantastic than the fate of Belgium, no more baseless than the destruction of Louvain. Let us consider for a moment what actually happened to Belgium. German mobilization began on August 1, German troops entered Belgium on August 3, Liège was captured on August 7, the Germans entered Brussels on August 20, they crossed the French frontier on August 23, Louvain was destroyed on August 26, and on September 1 the German army, having swept across Belgium, was within 25 miles of Paris. In just

* I cannot help wondering—and I hope I may say it without giving offense to Mr. Carnegie, for whom I have profound regard and who, unlike Sidney Smith's friend, needs no surgical operation to get a joke into his head—whether the canny Scot, should he be alive at the time of the invasion and be one of the ten, as he took his pen in hand to affix his signature to the bond, would still hold fast to the doctrine which he has enunciated in a recent interview, that "War never settles anything."

31 days, therefore, out of a state of profound peace, Belgium had been practically destroyed. How did this catastrophe happen? Simply because Belgium is only about one-tenth of Germany in size and resources; and her allies were not sufficiently prepared to come to her relief in time to save her from destruction. You will say that this could not happen to us, because of our immense resources and because of the ocean which separates us from the nations of Europe. As to the first, there is no easier mark than a rich nation unprepared for defense. As to the second, the ocean was a great barrier in the days of sailing-ships, but its value as a bulwark of defense has greatly diminished with the advent of steam and electricity. The German troops were across the Belgian frontier in 2 days; the German transports could not reach Long Island in less than 10 or 12 days. That is the only difference. The mobilization on the Belgian frontier took only 48 hours; the mobilization in the Baltic and North Sea harbors would take no

longer. Our interesting friend, von Edelsheim, has figured it all out in a general way and doubtless his comrades of the General Staff have elaborated it in greater detail. Let me again read you a few extracts from his book. On page 34, speaking of the German harbors, he says: "Bremerhaven is by far the best. In every respect it would take first place for embarkation, because of its extensive wharves. From this point 2 or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty. Cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with Hamburg is important. If it were brought up to full development it could take care of 2 divisions a day, which Hamburg could well supply. Glückstadt is an especially important base because most of our live-stock exporting business is carried on there. It is recommended that a short double-track railroad be built from Elmshorn to Glückstadt, making a connection with the reserve-corps frontier. In Glückstadt 1 infantry division and part of a cavalry division can be shipped [daily]."

In another part of his book he states the well-known fact that a German infantry division numbers 16,000 men. You will see, therefore, that he has figured it out that 6 divisions, 96,000 men, can be embarked in one day, or 240,000 men in two and a half days. I do not believe that our General Staff in Washington or any other military experts who are familiar with the German army will dispute the accuracy of his computation. In another part of his book (p. 55) he has given at length his reasons for believing that 10 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division can be despatched in 4 days. The number of ships and tonnage space for artillery and cavalry horses are all set forth. For instance (p. 50): "Three ships would accommodate 2 cavalry brigades." There would be no lack of ships. The fleet of the Hamburg line alone measures 1,168,000 tons, and of the North German Lloyd 795,000 tons. And if these are not enough, the harbors of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Copenhagen are close at

hand; and the events of last August do not warrant us in believing that any question of neutrality would prevent the seizure, if need be, of the shipping that crowds their docks. Euphemistically von Edelsheim uses the following language (p. 37):

"The problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the German steamers for military transporting. *This commission should also list the foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use in emergencies. Through close commercial relations this control can be extended to neighboring foreign ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Copenhagen), to the end that we might charter several large foreign steamers.*"*

If the neutral owners did not wish to charter their steamers, the Kaiser's dreadnoughts would be close at hand to persuade them. But, as a matter of fact, this would not be

* The italics are mine.

necessary, for Germany has an ample number of ships of her own available at any time to embark 240,000 infantry, with the corresponding numbers of artillery, cavalry, and engineers, and their necessary munitions, stores, and provisions. Edelsheim again has it all figured out (p. 47):

"The troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated by the ship's tonnage, that is, 60 per cent of the ship's capacity is net ton loading-space. The necessary space for us, for a long sea voyage, is set at 2 tons for each man, and 6 to 7 tons for each horse. The English and Russian estimates are about the same. But the English transports to Cape Town accommodated a larger number of troops than was thought possible, and the American transports to Cuba were increased by one-third."

On this basis the 15 divisions, numbering 240,000 infantry, would require 480,000 net tons, or 800,000 tons of ship's capacity, and the accompanying artillery, cavalry, stores, and provisions would take as much

more; or, in all, ships of a gross capacity of 1,600,000 tons. This is less than the tonnage of the Hamburg-American and North German Lloyd lines; but, in addition to these two lines, the tonnage of the other lines under the German flag is nearly three times as great, the total of German tonnage as given in the statistical books for 1914 being 4,892,-410. I can personally testify that his estimate of 1 man for every 2 tons net is substantially correct; for in 1898 I commanded the second expedition to the Philippines, which consisted of the 10th Pennsylvania, 1st Nebraska, and 1st Colorado, Volunteers, the 18th and 23d Infantry of the regular army, 2 batteries of field-artillery from Utah, and half a company of regular engineers, numbering in all about 4,800 men. We had four transports—improvised from mail-steamers plying on the Pacific—the largest of which had a gross tonnage of 5,000 and the smallest 1,500. The total tonnage was about 12,500. Sixty per cent of this is 7,500 tons. With 4,800 men on board we were

stowed at the rate of about 1 man for each 1½ net tons; and we were not uncomfortably crowded as we slowly steamed across the Pacific in echelon formation at 8 cable-lengths, our speed governed by the speed of the slowest ship, which was only 9 knots, so that we were 32 days covering the 7,000 or more nautical miles from San Francisco to Manila Bay. If we, in our state of almost total unpreparedness in 1898, could raise a volunteer army, improvise transports from ships which were not (as are those of Germany) built with special reference to the transport of troops and liable under their subsidy agreements to be taken instantly when needed as transports, cross a continent of 3,000 miles by rail, traverse 7,000 nautical miles of ocean, and make a successful landing, under the protection of the navy's guns, within a short distance of the Spanish forts and trenches—all within the space of 82 days from the declaration of war; and within 27 days thereafter, under the protection of 146 guns on Dewey's squadron, assault and capture an army, which

though small in numbers was larger than that of the assailants, and with it the capital of the Spanish dominions in the Far East, thereby terminating forever the Spanish colonial system in the Orient which had existed for more than 300 years—if, I say, we, almost ludicrously unready for war in 1898, could do this, is it to be supposed that Germany, with her plans studied out long in advance, with her enormous tonnage of fast ships, her troops in instant readiness, with no continent to cross and an ocean of barely 3,000 miles instead of 7,000 separating her from her opponent—is it to be supposed, I say, that Germany could not bring 240,000 infantry with the corresponding numbers of artillery and cavalry to our shores in from 12 to 15 days? No soldier who has studied the question will deny that Germany can do this; and, as I have previously pointed out, all history shows that the landing could not be prevented.

I fancy some one asking me: Do you really and seriously believe that Germany could ac-

tually capture New York in the manner you have described? And I answer: No, I do not. But the only reason why I do not believe it is because I am confident that the people of this country, with their strong common sense, when they understand this proposition, will see to it that their representatives in Congress provide a mobile army of sufficient size, sufficiently trained, with an adequate reserve, and with a proper number of highly educated officers; and that we shall have an abundance of scout aeroplanes which can constantly reconnoitre the ocean within a range of at least 200 miles from the coast so as to give warning of the enemy's approach. With our admirable railway system we could concentrate our mobile army—if we had one—opposite the point selected for the landing. And I should expect this mobile army—if we had one—to attack the invading army as soon as the latter passed out of the range of the guns on its ships, defeat it, and drive it back in disorder to within the range of these guns, and with no alternative save a hasty

re-embarkation under their protection, before a storm came up to disperse the fleet. And so the whole expedition would end in failure—like the failure to capture Paris on or before August 26. If these things did not happen—if we did not have a mobile army, if that army did not defeat the invading army as soon as it landed—then the capture of New York and the levy of a colossal indemnity would be as certain as any event in the future.

It is proper, however, to point out—and this is the whole purpose of my address—that we do not at this moment possess such a mobile army. We have no reserve, we have an insufficient number of highly educated officers. The General Staff of the army has asked for these things year after year, without serious attention being paid to its recommendations and advice. The Secretary of War in his last annual report—a document of rare sanity, calmness, close reasoning, and an adequate appreciation of the actual facts—has stated what is necessary to make a start in the right direction. I am leaving

with you a number of these reports, and I beg you to read them with as much care as you study the balance-sheets of your business. If his advice is disregarded too long, your balance-sheets may not be worth the studying. His programme is a modest one.

The Secretary says (p. 7): "The Regular Army of the United States on June 30, 1914, consisted of 4,701 officers and 87,781 men (including quartermaster corps, 3,809, and hospital corps, 4,055). Of these, 758 officers and 17,901 men belong to the coast artillery, and are therefore practically stationary in coast defenses; 1,008 officers and 18,434 men belong to the staff, technical and noncombatant branches of the army, including recruits and men engaged in recruiting. This leaves the army which can be moved from place to place—that is, the mobile army, so called—composed of 2,935 officers and 51,446 men."

He goes on further to show that we had, on June 30, 1914, in the Philippines, 9,600 men; in the Hawaiian Islands, 8,200 men; in the Canal Zone, 2,200 men; in China, Alaska,

and Porto Rico, 2,400 men, and in Vera Cruz, 4,100 men; or in all, 26,500 men on service outside of the continental limits of the United States. Of these about 4,000 belong to the coast artillery, and 22,500 to the mobile army. I quote again from the Secretary's report (p. 7):

"Practically all these organizations in the United States are on what is known as a peace footing, which means that an infantry company, which upon a war footing should have 150 men, now has 65 men; a cavalry troop, which upon a war footing should have 100 men, now has 71 men; an artillery battery, which upon a war footing should have 190 men, now has 133 men. The coast artillery companies are always kept on a war footing of 104 men each.

"In addition to work with the troops themselves, the officers of the army are called upon to do a great variety of work known as detached service. For instance, the engineers have 66 officers detached for river and harbor work, and the other branches of the army

have 578 officers of the line detached for service in training the organized militia of the several States, on duty at schools, recruiting, etc.

"As a result, scarcely any unit in the army ever has its proper complement of officers, and the need for an increase of officers is urgent and imperative. *In continental United States we had in the mobile army on June 30, 1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men.**

"We have a reserve—that is, men who have been trained in the army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called back to the colors in time of war—consisting of 16 men."

Now, "the wayfaring men, though fools," can understand that we cannot expect to resist successfully an invasion of 240,000 men with an army of 29,405 men.

What does the Secretary of War, realizing the responsibility which goes with his great office, propose to do in order to rectify this glaring state of unpreparedness? His proposition, as I have previously stated, is ex-

* The italics are mine.

tremely modest. I quote again from his report (pp. 10–11), and though the quotation is long, I do not apologize for taking up your time with it, for it is the nub of the whole matter:

"My recommendation of what we should immediately do is to fill up the existing organizations which compose the aggregate mobile army force just mentioned to their full strength. This would require 25,000 men. In addition to the enlisted men just mentioned, we should be authorized to obtain 1,000 more officers. The legislation to accomplish these purposes would be of the very simplest character, being merely authorizations to the department to do these things.

"On June 30, 1914, 20.43 per cent of the line officers of the army were away from their commands. This results in depleting the proper quota of instructors in the army. The instruction of the organized militia suffers wofully from the lack of officers available for service with the militia. Efficient officers, above all things, cannot be improvised. Depending, as we are, upon a small regular force,

and contemplating a large expansion in time of war, it is essential that we at least should not permit the number of officers to fall below that number which is absolutely requisite for the proper performance of current military duties.

"An increase of the enlisted personnel of the army by 25,000 men would accomplish threefold results. It would, as before mentioned, bring up to full strength the existing units of the mobile army in continental United States, and thus supply a more adequate force. Second, it would afford training for the officers in the command of such units as they must command in time of war and would prevent, as far as the regular army is concerned, the crowding of the ranks with raw levies which always disorganize and render inefficient the organizations into which they come. Third, it would be a wise investment from the standpoint of economy, in that no material increase of overhead charges would be necessary, and the addition of these men could be effected at a per-capita cost to the

government of about one-third the per-capita cost of existing conditions. Since the existing physical plant and the administrative organization would not have to be in any way increased to take care of this increased force, the only additional expense would be the clothing, feeding, and paying thereof.

"By the time these 25,000 men could be procured the mobile forces in the United States, as hereinbefore pointed out, would number 24,602; so that after the addition the mobile army in continental United States would consist of 49,602 men.

"With the army thus increased, we would then be able to undertake the next necessity, which is absolutely imperative, and that is the preparation of a reserve. The present legislation with respect to a reserve has proven utterly useless for the purpose, it having produced in 24 months only 16 men, and there is little or no hope that it will ever properly accomplish its purpose. The reasons why it will not do so it is not profitable to discuss.

"Again, without attempting to wait until perfection has been reached, it seems to me that it is only the part of wisdom to do that which we know will produce a beneficial result, and one that approximates the best. I am firmly convinced that if we can use the standing army as a school through which to pass men who come into it, with the knowledge that if they are proficient they can be discharged at any time after a year or 18 months, we will begin at once to build up the necessary reserve, and will, for the first time in the military history of this country, have something approximating a balanced organization. There is, unfortunately, opposition to this policy. I say 'unfortunately' because it is always the part of wisdom, it seems to me, to select the best that is possible, out of what is obtainable, rather than to reject that obtainable best because it is not perfection. Some of the opposition is on economical grounds, and, in my view, should not be determinative if the other considerations that I have noted are true. Other of

the opposition is based upon the idea that 1 year or 18 months is not sufficient to train a soldier. As to this, it is a curious exhibition of mental operations to realize that those who make this argument and who have to acknowledge that without reserves we must depend upon volunteers, are constantly asserting that we can safely rely upon volunteers because they can be thoroughly trained in 6 months. It is furthermore true that by intensive military training any young man of good health and average mentality can be made a serviceable soldier in 12 months, and, in fact, has been so made. This has been tried abroad, and I have caused it to be tried under my own administration and inspection. Even if there were doubt about it, it would not cause a different conclusion to be reached by a reasonable man, because we certainly would be better off with a reserve of men who had had 1 year's training than we are without any reserve at all, and having to depend, as we do, upon men who have never had any training whatever.

I caused, about a year ago, recruits, as they came in, and without selection, to be organized into a battery of artillery, a troop of cavalry, and a company of infantry; and from my own observation and from the reports of experts, each of these units, well within a year, was found proficient to a very high degree.

"I am therefore firmly convinced that we should have immediate legislation dealing with the matter of enlistment and reserve. I am not so much concerned with the length of the enlistment, provided the Secretary of War is given power to discharge into the reserve, at the end of 12 months, those who have shown themselves proficient up to a required standard."

That is the whole programme at the present moment. I again repeat that it is most modest. There will be other things to come later—summer camps of university students like those which were so splendidly successful last summer at Burlington and elsewhere; instruction in the rudiments of the military

art at public schools, colleges, and universities; arrangements by which every young man in this great land of ours shall hold in his hand before he is 21 years of age an army rifle, and aim and fire it at a target; enlargement of the Military Academy at West Point, and when it reaches the point when it can no longer be enlarged, without injury to its unique system of instruction, then found another West Point on the Pacific coast, and subsequently, if needed, a third in the Mississippi valley; improvement of the militia, and recognition of the great services which the men in the militia render by giving up to their military duties time which would otherwise be spent in recreation—all these will come in due time, and their cost will be but a trifle compared with the benefits which they will produce. But for the present the only thing to do is to GET SQUARELY BEHIND THIS MODEST PROGRAMME OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, AND SEE THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS ENACT IT INTO LAW BEFORE CONGRESS ADJOURNS ON THE FOURTH

DAY OF NEXT MARCH, WHICH IS ONLY 40 DAYS FROM THIS DATE.

Gentlemen of the Economic Club, I suppose that it is fair for me to assume that when you asked me to address you on this subject you considered me competent to discuss it, and to give you advice at the end of the discussion. What advice have I to give? Simply this: this great subject is, above all others, non-partisan. A week ago to-day I sat beside the Secretary of War at lunch, and at the close of the lunch listened to a great speech from him. I say it was a great speech, because it was so calm, so forceful, so clearly reasoned out, so absolutely convincing to every one of his hearers, so entirely devoid of hysteria. The speech was made in the Republican Club of the City of New York, of which I have been a member since before the time when my hair began to turn gray. The audience, which packed the room to the walls, was composed of hidebound Republicans; the speaker was a Democratic Secretary of War. He was received with tumultuous applause

at the beginning; and, though he spoke without notes, his thought was so logical, so concise, so free from dogmatism, so absolutely unanswerable, that the applause at the close was, I may fairly say, overwhelming.

Now, what is there to do for you men here in Maine? First of all, keep this question strictly non-partisan. I fear the partisanship of an overzealous gentleman from Massachusetts has already lessened the chances of getting the desired legislation at this session of Congress. Partisanship has no place in any question which extends beyond the ocean's edge. Next, get the Secretary's report and read it; ponder over it. His military advisers give their whole lives to this question. They are men of good repute, they are very able, they do not want war, which will make their wives widows and their children orphans. But they know what their duty is, and they fearlessly do it. It is to tell the Secretary truthfully what the real situation is, as derived from their lifelong and constant study of it, based on data and in-

formation possessed by no other body of men in this country to an equal degree.

The Secretary was new to this problem 2 years ago. He frankly says that he is now ashamed of the ignorance which he then possessed, and which is the ignorance of the average highly educated lawyer or business man of to-day. But he has said that he means from now on to try by every proper means to remove this ignorance in others. He brought to the problem a trained legal mind, accustomed to forming judgment upon important legal questions during the years that he sat on the bench of the New Jersey Court of Appeals. He has given 2 years of study to this case, longer than he ever gave to any case which came before him on the bench. He has now given you his matured conclusions—first a statement of the actual facts and then a synopsis of the measures which in his judgment are necessary to meet this state of facts.

With the increasing complexity in our affairs we are obliged every year more and

more to intrust questions of great importance to referees, masters in chancery, and other experts, for examination and report; and when we get their reports, unless they contain some glaring error, we adopt them and put them into operation. No question has been so thoroughly examined by experts of the highest competence as this question of national defense, beginning, as I have said, 40 years ago by General Sherman and continued by his successors in command of the army—Sheridan, Schofield, and Miles—and especially in recent years by the younger men of the General Staff, which was not in existence prior to 1903. The result of 40 years' study is now before you, condensed and summarized and brought up to date by the distinguished lawyer who now holds the office of Secretary of War. Can you do better than follow his advice?

If you approve it, then see that it is carried into effect. Whenever the voters of this country make up their minds on any question, Congress is quick to respond to their wishes.

There is need for prompt action. Congress will adjourn in less than 6 weeks. Your Legislature meets only biennially, but fortunately it is now in session. See that petitions are sent to it, bearing thousands of names, requesting the Legislature to pass without delay a joint resolution instructing your senators and representatives in Congress to vote in favor of the adoption of the Secretary's recommendations. They have already been incorporated in the Army Appropriation Bill. Last night they were defeated in the House; Monday morning they will be before the Senate, where they have been already favorably reported from the Military Committee.

There used to be a saying in my youth: "As goes Maine, so goes the Union." Since you no longer have October elections, this saying is not now heard. But the men of Maine are just as hard-headed, just as full of plain common sense, as they were when you held your national elections in October. If such a joint resolution is passed by the Legis-

lature of Maine, it will be noted the following morning by every State Legislature which is in session from New Hampshire to Arizona, and from Washington to Florida.

"Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just." Thus, in Shakespeare's incomparable words, meditated Henry VI just after he had witnessed the violent quarrel of Warwick and Suffolk over the blood-stained corpse of murdered Gloucester. Five centuries have gone. Henry Plantagenet and Richard of York, Warwick and Suffolk and Gloucester are but dust. Their quarrels, save for Shakespeare, are less than dust. Still is it true, as then it was.

Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just. Ay, true indeed! But quarrels there yet will be. And no nation unarmed can enforce its quarrel, however just.

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Arthur E. Nelson

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